Managerial ability, information quality, and the design and pricing of corporate debt
Alex Petkevich () and
Andrew Prevost ()
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Alex Petkevich: John and Lillian Neff Department of Finance, University of Toledo
Andrew Prevost: University of Vermont
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2018, vol. 51, issue 4, 1033-1069
Abstract We examine if managerial ability affects the efficiency of the contracting environment with lenders. We find that higher ability alters the balance of information-sensitive covenants demanded by outside investors, increases the issuance of bonds with longer maturity, and decreases the issuance of senior secured debt. We also document higher ability reduces the risk premium demanded by investors on information-sensitive debt. These results are collectively consistent with the premise that the mitigation of information risk is an important dimension of managerial ability that has a direct bearing on the structure and pricing of corporate debt.
Keywords: Managerial ability; Asymmetric information; Corporate debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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