Do political connections reduce earnings management?

Mohamed Khalil, Sandy Harianto () and Yilmaz Guney
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Mohamed Khalil: University of Hull
Sandy Harianto: Universitas Prasetiya Mulya

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2022, vol. 59, issue 1, No 9, 273-310

Abstract: Abstract This study examines whether political connections are associated with earnings management (both accrual-based and real) and whether the association is influenced by corporate governance and external auditing qualities. Empirical evidence on the association between political connections and earnings management remains unclear and offers mixed results. Using a sample of Indonesian firms, we find that political connections are negatively related to accrual-based (AEM) and real (REM) earnings management. In addition, the negative relationship between political connections and earnings management is more pronounced in better-governed firms and those audited by one of the Big 4 auditors. The results are robust to alternative measures of earnings management, endogeneity, and subsample tests. Our results extend the literature by shedding additional light on the governance role and benefits of political connections.

Keywords: Political connections; Accrual-based earnings management; Real earnings management; Corporate governance; Audit quality; Indonesia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11156-022-01062-y

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