Corporate growth and strategic payout policy
Bai-Sian Chen (),
Hong-Yi Chen (),
Hsiao-Yin Chen () and
Fang-Chi Lin ()
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Bai-Sian Chen: National Chengchi University
Hong-Yi Chen: National Chengchi University
Hsiao-Yin Chen: Kainan University
Fang-Chi Lin: National Pingtung University
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2022, vol. 59, issue 2, No 7, 669 pages
Abstract:
Abstract This study investigates the role of corporate growth in corporate payout policies. We define a good signaling firm as a high-growth firm paying dividends. We find that good signaling firms have better future operating performances, indicating that high-growth firms pay dividends for the purpose of signaling rather than reducing the problem of free cash flow. In addition, the market efficiently gives price appreciation to good signaling firms around the dividend announcement dates. We also report that high-growth firms can utilize dividend payments to reduce information asymmetry between firms and investors and obtain new funds at lower costs. However, if market uncertainty is high, the benefit of good signaling may be offset by the increase in the cost of equity. High-growth firms thus tend to pay lower dividends if they face higher systematic risk or downturn probability.
Keywords: Dividend; Corporate growth; Payout policy; Signaling hypothesis; Cost of equity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:59:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11156-022-01053-z
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DOI: 10.1007/s11156-022-01053-z
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