Regulation and post-crisis pay disclosure strategies of banks

Sara De Masi (), Kose John (), Agnieszka Slomka-Golebiowska and Piotr Urbanek ()
Additional contact information
Sara De Masi: University of Florence (ITA)
Kose John: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business (US)
Piotr Urbanek: University of Lodz (PL)

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2023, vol. 61, issue 4, No 3, 1243-1275

Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this paper is to examine how banks changed their executive pay disclosure practices in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. In particular, we examine banks’ response to regulations meant to curb banks’ short-term risk-taking incentives. We document that differences in the compliance strategies among banks are function of bank’s ownership structure and board governance. Using a unique hand-collected dataset, we find that foreign-controlled banks disclose significantly more on executive compensation than do nonforeign-controlled banks. Also, banks with high pension fund ownership adopt a higher level of disclosures. Foreign-controlled banks undertake more voluntary disclosure on executive compensation than do nonforeign-controlled banks. We go further and we test the moderating effect of board compensation committee meetings on the relationship between bank ownership and disclosure. We document that more frequent meetings of the compensation committee increase the executive pay disclosure. We find that the incremental effect of more frequent compensation committee meetings on disclosure is lower for foreign-controlled and for banks with a higher ownership of pension funds. These results may suggest that the board compensation committee matters less for foreign-controlled banks as they are already committed to disclose.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Executive pay disclosure; Banks; Compensation committee; Regulation; Global financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G38 G39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11156-023-01177-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:61:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s11156-023-01177-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/finance/journal/11156/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01177-w

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting is currently edited by Cheng-Few Lee

More articles in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().