Why do contracts differ between venture capital types?
Julia Hirsch () and
Uwe Walz ()
Small Business Economics, 2013, vol. 40, issue 3, 525 pages
Abstract:
The main objective of the present paper is to investigate differences in the design of contracts between venture capitalists and their portfolio firms across venture capital (VC) types. By controlling for selection effects, we focus on contract design differences which reflect differences in corporate governance approaches across VC types. To address this issue, we use a unique, hand-collected German data set consisting of all contractual details of VC investments into 290 entrepreneurial firms in the period 1990–2004. By employing various matching procedures, we show that VC types differ in their corporate governance approach vis-à-vis their portfolio firms. It turns out that independent VCs, when compared to captive VCs, use significantly more contract mechanisms which induce active intervention. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013
Keywords: Venture capital; Corporate governance; Matching; Contract design; G24; G32; G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:40:y:2013:i:3:p:511-525
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DOI: 10.1007/s11187-011-9388-6
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