Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications

Jonathan Bendor () and Piotr Swistak

Theory and Decision, 1998, vol. 45, issue 2, 99-159

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionarily stable strategies; Evolutionary equilibria; Evolution of cooperation; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD); Tit For Tat (TFT) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1005083323183 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:45:y:1998:i:2:p:99-159

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005083323183

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().