Measures of Powerlessness in Simple Games

Thomas Quint ()

Theory and Decision, 2001, vol. 50, issue 4, 367-382

Abstract: Consider a simple game with n players. Let ψ i be the Shapley–Shubik power index for player i. Then 1-ψ i measures his powerlessness. We break down this powerlessness into two components – a `quixote index' Q i (which measures how much of a `quixote' i is), and a `follower index' F i (which measures how much of a `follower' he is). Formulae, properties, and axiomatizations for Q and F are given. Examples are also supplied. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1010315526150

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