Constrained Monotonicity and the Measurement of Power

Manfred Holler (), Rie Ono and Frank Steffen

Theory and Decision, 2001, vol. 50, issue 4, 383-395

Abstract: In this paper we will discuss constraints on the number of (non-dummy) players and on the distribution of votes such that local monotonicity is satisfied for the Public Good Index. These results are compared to properties which are related to constraints on the redistribution of votes (such as implied by global monotonicity). The discussion shows that monotonicity is not a straightforward criterion of classification for power measures. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Keywords: Voting Power Indices; Public Good Index; Local Monotonocity; Player-Constrained Local Monotonicity; Partial Local Monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1010335410952

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