Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations

Enrico Denti () and Nando Prati ()

Theory and Decision, 2004, vol. 56, issue 1, 183-192

Abstract: In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-5644-4

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