Does trust matter for R&D cooperation? A game theoretic examination

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin and Shyama Ramani ()

Theory and Decision, 2005, vol. 57, issue 2, 143-180

Abstract: The game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, it identifies the trust conditions under which firms initiate R&D alliances and contribute to their success. The higher the spillovers, the higher the level of trust required to initiate R&D cooperation for non-opportunists, while the inverse holds for opportunists. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: Non-cooperative game; R&D cooperation; Trust and opportunism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:57:y:2005:i:2:p:143-180

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-3673-7

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