Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?
Davide Cervone (),
William Gehrlein () and
William Zwicker ()
Theory and Decision, 2005, vol. 58, issue 2, 145-185
Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as nâ†’âˆž, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results from two independent studies, and contradicts a published result of Van Newenhizen (Economic Theory 2, 69â€“83. (1992)). Copyright Springer 2005
Keywords: Condorcet efficiency; scoring systems; Borda count; impartial anonymous culture; voting; C67 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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