Potential and ‘Power of a Collectivity to Act’ *

Annick Laruelle () and Federico Valenciano ()

Theory and Decision, 2005, vol. 58, issue 2, 187-194

Abstract: This paper connects two notions: Hart and Mas-Colell’s ‘potential’, related to the value of coalitional games, and Coleman’s earlier notion of ‘power of a collectivity to act’, related to the easiness to make decisions by means of a voting rule. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: voting rules; potential; simple games; C71; D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:58:y:2005:i:2:p:187-194

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-6848-y

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