Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets

Antonio Romero-Medina ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

Theory and Decision, 2005, vol. 58, issue 3, 305-324

Abstract: This paper presents a procedure to select equitable stable allocations in two-sided matching markets without side payments. The Equitable set is computed using the Equitable algorithm. The algorithm limits the set of options available for each agent throughout the procedure. The stable matchings selected are generally not extreme, form a lattice and satisfy the condition of being “Ralwsianâ€\x9D in each partition of the market. The Equitable algorithm can also be used to select a particular matching from the Equitable Set favoring particular agents independent of the side of the market to which they belong. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: matching markets; fair distribution; fair algorithm. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-6846-0

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