Stability and Efficiency of Partitions in Matching Problems

İpek Özkal-Sanver ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ipek Ozkal-Sanver ()

Theory and Decision, 2005, vol. 59, issue 3, 193-205

Abstract: We define two versions of stability and efficiency of partitions and analyze their relationships for some matching rules. The stability and efficiency of a partition depends on the matching rule φ. The results are stated under various membership property rights axioms. It is shown that in a world where agents can freely exit from and enter coalitions, whenever the matching rule is individually rational and Pareto optimal, the set of φ-stable and φ-efficient partitions coincide and it is unique: the grand coalition. Then we define a weaker version of stability and efficiency, namely specific to a given preference profile and find some negative results for stable matching rules. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: matching; partitions; membership property rights; stability; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-0945-9

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