On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games

Caroline Berden () and Hans Peters

Theory and Decision, 2006, vol. 60, issue 4, 359-370

Abstract: Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2. Copyright Springer 2006

Keywords: bimatrix games; coordination games; risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-3986-1

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