Deriving Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism from De Finetti’s Book-Making Argument

Enrico Diecidue ()

Theory and Decision, 2006, vol. 61, issue 4, 363-371

Abstract: The book-making argument was introduced by de Finetti as a principle to prove the existence and uniqueness of subjective probabilities. It has subsequently been accepted as a principle of rationality for decisions under uncertainty. This note shows that the book-making argument has relevant applications to welfare: it gives a new foundation for utilitarianism that is alternative to Harsanyi’s, it generalizes foundations based on the theorem of the alternative, and it avoids arguments based on expected utility. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: book-making argument; policy independence; utilitarianism; D60; D71; D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-006-9019-x

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