EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Finite Normal Form Games

Fabrizio Germano ()

Theory and Decision, 2007, vol. 62, issue 4, 333 pages

Abstract: The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the “folk resultsâ€\x9D of evolutionary game theory, typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies, carry over to the present environments. The results are also related to some recent experiments on rules and games. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: bounded rationality; evolutionary dynamics; learning; normal form games; rules; stochastic dynamics; C72; C73; D81; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-007-9032-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:4:p:311-333

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-007-9032-8

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2022-08-17
Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:4:p:311-333