The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas

Aki Lehtinen ()

Theory and Decision, 2007, vol. 63, issue 1, 40 pages

Abstract: This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: agendas; counterbalancing; simulation; strategic voting; welfare; D71; D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4

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