A recursive core for partition function form games
LÃ¡szlÃ³ KÃ³czy ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: László Á. Kóczy ()
Theory and Decision, 2007, vol. 63, issue 1, 41-51
We present a well-defined generalisation of the core to coalitional games with externalities, where the value of a deviation is given by an endogenous response, the solution (if nonempty: the core) of the residual game. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Keywords: core; externalities; optimism; partition function; pessimism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: A recursive core for partition function form games (2006)
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