Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games

Irene Valsecchi

Theory and Decision, 2013, vol. 74, issue 1, 53 pages

Abstract: For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, 1982 ) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Cheap-talk; Strategic information transmission; Multiple equilibria; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3

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