Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation

Yoshio Kamijo

Theory and Decision, 2013, vol. 75, issue 3, 339-357

Abstract: We study the stable standard of behavior in a perfect foresight situation that was introduced by Xue (Econ Theory 11:603–627, 1998 ). We assume that the inducement relations are invertible and coalition free. We show that the conditions are sufficient for the existence of the nonempty-valued optimistic/conservative stable standard of behavior for perfect foresight situation (OSSB-PF/CSSB-PF). Moreover, we find that an OSSB-PF supports a Pareto-efficient outcome as a stable outcome; if the preference relations are strict, only the Pareto-efficient outcomes are supported by the OSSB-PF. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Perfect foresight; OSSB; CSSB; Invertible inducement relations; Coalition-free inducement relations; Coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:75:y:2013:i:3:p:339-357

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().