Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

Mathieu Lefebvre and Ferdinand Vieider ()

Theory and Decision, 2013, vol. 75, issue 4, 497-517

Abstract: Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Executive compensation; Stock options; Incentives; Accountability; Risk-taking; D03; G28; G32; J33; L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9335-2

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