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Different carrots and different sticks: do we reward and punish differently than we approve and disapprove?

Andreas Leibbrandt () and Raúl López-Pérez

Theory and Decision, 2014, vol. 76, issue 1, 95-118

Abstract: This paper reports lab data from four games in order to analyze and compare the motivations behind monetary punishment and reward and their non-monetary counterparts, disapproval and approval, an important question given that both types of punishment/rewards affect cooperation and norm compliance. The results in our games support the hypothesis that a motivation akin to reciprocity plays the key role for approval and disapproval whereas payoff comparisons play the key role for monetary rewards and punishment. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Approval; Disapproval; Inequity aversion; Monetary/non-monetary punishment and reward; Reciprocity; Social norms; C70; D91; D63; D74; Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9356-5

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