Hold or roll: reaching the goal in jeopardy race games
Darryl Seale (),
William Stein and
Amnon Rapoport
Theory and Decision, 2014, vol. 76, issue 3, 419-450
Abstract:
We consider a class of dynamic tournaments in which two contestants are faced with a choice between two courses of action. The first is a riskless option (“hold”) of maintaining the resources the contestant already has accumulated in her turn and ceding the initiative to her rival. The second is the bolder option (“roll”) of taking the initiative of accumulating additional resources, and thereby moving ahead of her rival, while at the same time sustaining a risk of temporary setback. We study this tournament in the context of a jeopardy race game (JRG), extend the JRG to $$N > 2$$ N > 2 contestants, and construct its equilibrium solution. Compared to the equilibrium solution, the results of three experiments reveal a dysfunctional bias in favor of the riskless option. This bias is substantially mitigated when the contestants are required to commit in advance how long to pursue the risky course of action. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Keywords: Dynamic decision making; Jeopardy race game; Equilibrium solutions; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-013-9388-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:76:y:2014:i:3:p:419-450
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9388-x
Access Statistics for this article
Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui
More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().