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Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited

Sususmu Cato ()

Theory and Decision, 2014, vol. 76, issue 4, 511-527

Abstract: This paper aims to reexamine the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of social choice. A generalized notion of independence is introduced to clarify an informational requirement of binary independence which is usually imposed in the Arrovian framework. We characterize the implication of binary independence. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Arrow’s impossibility theorem; Independence of irrelevant alternatives; Binary independence; Collective choice rule; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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