Experimental payment protocols and the Bipolar Behaviorist

Glenn Harrison and J. Swarthout

Theory and Decision, 2014, vol. 77, issue 3, 423-438

Abstract: If someone claims that individuals behave as if they violate the independence axiom (IA) when making decisions over simple lotteries, it is invariably on the basis of experiments and theories that must assume the IA through the use of the random lottery incentive mechanism (RLIM). We refer to someone who holds this view as a Bipolar Behaviorist, exhibiting pessimism about the axiom when it comes to characterizing how individuals directly evaluate two lotteries in a binary choice task, but optimism about the axiom when it comes to characterizing how individuals evaluate multiple lotteries that make up the incentive structure for a multiple-task experiment. We reject the hypothesis about subject behavior underlying this stance: we find that preferences estimated with a model that assumes violations of the IA are significantly affected when one elicits choices with procedures that require the independence assumption, as compared to choices elicited with procedures that do not require the assumption. The upshot is that one cannot consistently estimate popular models that relax the IA using data from experiments that assume the validity of the RLIM. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Experiment; Independence axiom; Payment protocols; Random lottery incentive mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9447-y

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