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Conditions on social-preference cycles

Sususmu Cato ()

Theory and Decision, 2015, vol. 79, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles”. The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory; on the other hand, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the two approaches by taking a close look at two works, Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory 21:28–45, 1979 ) and Schwartz (J Econ Theory 137:688–695, 2007 ). Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Voting mechanism; Social-preference cycle; Voting paradox; Decisiveness; Generalization; D71; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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