The $$q$$ q -majority efficiency of positional rules
Sébastien Courtin (),
Mathieu Martin and
Issofa Moyouwou ()
Theory and Decision, 2015, vol. 79, issue 1, 31-49
According to a given quota $$q$$ q , a candidate $$a$$ a is beaten by another candidate $$b$$ b if at least a proportion of $$q$$ q individuals prefer $$b$$ b to $$a$$ a . The $$q$$ q -majority efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a candidate who is never beaten under the $$q$$ q -majority, given that such a candidate exits. Closed form representations are obtained for the $$q$$ q -majority efficiency of positional rules (simple and sequential) in three-candidate elections. It turns out that the $$q$$ q -majority efficiency is: (i) significantly greater for sequential rules than for simple positional rules; and (ii) very close to the $$q$$ q -Condorcet efficiency, the conditional probability that a positional rule will elect the candidate who beats all others under the $$q$$ q -majority, when one exists. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
Keywords: Positional rules (simple and sequential); Majority efficiency; $$q$$ q -Majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:79:y:2015:i:1:p:31-49
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui
More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().