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The $$q$$ q -majority efficiency of positional rules

Sébastien Courtin (), Mathieu Martin and Issofa Moyouwou ()

Theory and Decision, 2015, vol. 79, issue 1, 31-49

Abstract: According to a given quota $$q$$ q , a candidate $$a$$ a is beaten by another candidate $$b$$ b if at least a proportion of $$q$$ q individuals prefer $$b$$ b to $$a$$ a . The $$q$$ q -majority efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a candidate who is never beaten under the $$q$$ q -majority, given that such a candidate exits. Closed form representations are obtained for the $$q$$ q -majority efficiency of positional rules (simple and sequential) in three-candidate elections. It turns out that the $$q$$ q -majority efficiency is: (i) significantly greater for sequential rules than for simple positional rules; and (ii) very close to the $$q$$ q -Condorcet efficiency, the conditional probability that a positional rule will elect the candidate who beats all others under the $$q$$ q -majority, when one exists. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Positional rules (simple and sequential); Majority efficiency; $$q$$ q -Majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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