A preference model for choice subject to surprise
Simon Grant () and
John Quiggin ()
Theory and Decision, 2015, vol. 79, issue 2, 167-180
Grant and Quiggin (Econ Theo 54:717–755, 2013a , J Econ Behav Organ 93:17–31, 2013b ) suggest that agents employ heuristics to constrain the set of acts under consideration before applying standard decision theory, based on their restricted model of the world to the remaining acts. The aim of this paper is to provide an axiomatic foundation, and an associated representation theorem, for the preference model proposed by Grant and Quiggin. The unawareness of the agent is encoded both in the specification of the states and in an elaboration of the set of consequences. We illustrate how the representation can be applied to rationalize two notions of the precautionary principle that were proposed and discussed in Grant and Quiggin (J Econ Behav Organ 93:17–31, 2013b ). Copyright The Author(s) 2015
Keywords: Unforeseen consequences; Bounded rationality; Expected uncertain utility; D80; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:79:y:2015:i:2:p:167-180
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