Cooperative games with homogeneous groups of participants

L. Hernández-Lamoneda and Francisco Sánchez-Sánchez ()

Theory and Decision, 2015, vol. 79, issue 3, 461 pages

Abstract: We consider a class of games, which we call “groups’ games”, in which players are partitioned into classes within which players may be considered indistinguishable. We compute explicit formulas for some of the principal values restricted to these games. This is particularly useful for dealing with games with a large number of players where the usual formulas would be impractical (or impossible) to compute. We give several examples that illustrate how this idea may be applied to concrete situations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Shapley value; Cooperative games; Values for TU games; Homogeneous groups games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9474-8

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