Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness

Jean Beuve and Claudine Desrieux ()

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 80, issue 1, 125-158

Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the interaction between repeated transactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. We design an indefinitely repeated games experiment between identifiable players. In this experiment, the probability of continuation and the level of shared information vary over the treatments. The level of contractual completeness is decided by participants at each period. Our results show that past interactions are a stronger determinant of the level of investment in contractual completeness than the perspective of future business. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Keywords: Contractual incompleteness; Cooperation; Repeated games; Reputation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:80:y:2016:i:1:p:125-158

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9493-0

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