A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members

Dominik Karos ()
Additional contact information
Dominik Karos: University of Oxford

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 81, issue 1, No 6, 89-100

Abstract: Abstract Brams’ paradox of new members and Shenoy’s paradox of smaller coalitions are, in a sense, equivalent. They are both implied by the monotonicity of a power index: while the first is exhibited on every simple game that is not strong, the latter can be observed on every simple game in which players are not almost symmetric. For the Shapley–Shubik index, this symmetry condition is not only necessary but also sufficient to avoid the paradox of smaller coalitions.

Keywords: Paradox of smaller coalitions; Paradox of new members; Monotonic power indices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-015-9530-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:81:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-015-9530-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9530-z

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().