Rational beliefs in rationalizability

Xiao Luo

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 81, issue 2, No 4, 189-198

Abstract: Abstract In this paper I scrutinize the “rational beliefs” in the concept of rationalizability in strategic games [Bernheim (Econometrica 52:1007–1028, 1984), Pearce (Econometrica 52:1029–1051, 1984)]. I illustrate through an example that a rationalizable strategy may not be supported by a “rational belief”, at least under one plausible interpretation of “rational belief”. I offer an alternative formulation of “rational belief” in the concept of rationalizability, which yields a novel epistemic interpretation of the notion of point-rationalizability.

Keywords: Game theory; Rationalizability; Rational beliefs; Common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-015-9528-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:81:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-015-9528-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9528-6

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().