Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective

Wynn C. Stirling () and Teppo Felin
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Wynn C. Stirling: Brigham Young University
Teppo Felin: University of Oxford

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 81, issue 2, No 8, 279-308

Abstract: Abstract Satisficing is a central concept in both individual and social multiagent decision making. In this paper we first extend the notion of satisficing by formally modeling the tradeoff between costs (the need to conserve resources) and decision failure. Second, we extend this notion of “neo”-satisficing into the context of social or multiagent decision making and interaction, and model the social conditioning of preferences in a satisficing framework.

Keywords: Game theory; Satisficing; Conditional preferences; Multiple agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9531-y

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