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Hart–Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value

Tomohiko Kawamori

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 81, issue 3, 357-369

Abstract: Abstract We consider an implementation of the discounted Shapley value. We modify the Hart–Mas-Colell model such that each player discounts future payoffs and proposes not only an allocation, but also a coalition. We show that the discounted Shapley value is supported by each stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the modified game such that in each subgame, the coalition that consists of all active players immediately forms. We also provide conditions for such a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium to exist.

Keywords: Discounted Shapley value; Coalitional bargaining; Noncooperative support; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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