Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games

Rene van den Brink (), Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki () and Boram Park ()
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Boram Park: Ajou University

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 81, issue 3, No 8, 427-447

Abstract: Abstract A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution (which allocates the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ consisting of all players equally over all players) and the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value (which first assigns every player its singleton worth and then allocates the remainder of the worth of the grand coalition, N, equally over all players). The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value (which first assigns every player its contribution to the ‘grand coalition’ and then allocates the remainder equally over all players). We provide characterizations of the two classes of solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.

Keywords: TU-game; Equal division solution; CIS-value; ENSC-value; Population solidarity; Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9538-z

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