The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
Yukinori Iwata ()
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Yukinori Iwata: Queen Mary University of London
Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 81, issue 4, No 4, 535-552
Abstract:
Abstract In this paper, we introduce an Arrovian social choice framework with the process of nomination. We consider a two-stage social choice procedure in which some alternatives are first nominated by aggregating the opinions of nominators, and then the society makes a collective choice from the nominated alternatives by aggregating the preferences of voters. Each nominator’s opinion is a positive, negative, or neutral view as to whether each alternative deserves to be eligible for collective decision making. If a voter is a nominator, his preference space is restricted by his opinion as follows: he always prefers positive alternatives to neutral ones and neutral alternatives to negative ones, according to his opinion. When each nominating voter has such a preference space, we first characterize Arrow-consistent preference domains at the second stage of the social choice framework. Second, we find a resolution of Arrow’s impossibility theorem when at least one nominating voter exists.
Keywords: Nomination; Nominating voters; Arrow-consistent preference domains; Arrow’s impossibility theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:81:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9547-y
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9547-y
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