Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
Giorgos Stamatopoulos ()
Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 81, issue 4, No 5, 553-570
Abstract This paper uses the theory of strategic delegation to derive an equivalence between the models of simultaneous and sequential quantity competition in oligopoly. It shows that Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria under managerial delegation are identical provided delegation is sequential under the first framework and simultaneous under the second. Furthermore, the first (second) mover in the game under sequential delegation earns the same profit as the second (first) mover in the game under sequential quantity competition.
Keywords: Strategic delegation; Cournot competition; Stackelberg competition; Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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