Multiple rounds in a chain store game

Michael Melles and Rainer Nitsche ()
Additional contact information
Michael Melles: Helvetia Insurances
Rainer Nitsche: E.CA Economics and European School of Management and Technology

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 81, issue 4, No 6, 579 pages

Abstract: Abstract In textbook models of reputation, a number of entry games are played sequentially. A multimarket incumbent—the chain store—deters entry of “early” small entrants with a threat of predation. In the last markets of the game, entry occurs stochastically. We show that this stochastic entry is due to a restrictive assumption and vanishes if entrants that initially decided to stay out are allowed to reconsider their decision following entry elsewhere.

Keywords: Multimarket Firms; Entry; Predation; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 L1 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-016-9551-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:81:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9551-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9551-2

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().