Linear symmetric rankings for TU-games

L. Hernández-Lamoneda () and F. Sánchez-Sánchez
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L. Hernández-Lamoneda: Centro de Investigación en Matemáticas, A.C.
F. Sánchez-Sánchez: Centro de Investigación en Matemáticas, A.C.

Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 82, issue 4, No 1, 484 pages

Abstract: Abstract We define ranking as an equivalence relation on the set of power indices and study those that have a linear and symmetric representative. Moreover, we classify—or parametrize—those rankings that reward “positive” payoffs for “positive” participation. It is shown that these are in 1-1 correspondence with the points of the standard simplex. Moreover, this correspondence is convex. Finally, we contrast this classification with Saari–Sieberg’s approach via “positive” semi-values.

Keywords: Ranking; Linear power index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:82:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9576-6

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9576-6

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