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Clan information market games

Saadia Obadi () and Silvia Miquel ()

Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 82, issue 4, 501-517

Abstract: Abstract We introduce a TU-game that describes a market where information is distributed among several agents and all these pieces of information are necessary to produce a good. This situation will be called clan information market. The class of the corresponding TU-games, the clan information market games (CIGs), is a subset of the class of clan games. We provide some well-known point solutions for CIGs in terms of the market data.

Keywords: Information market; Clan; Core; Shapley value; $$\tau $$ τ -value; PMAS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:82:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9583-7