Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
Sylvain Béal (),
Eric Rémila and
Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 83, issue 1, 61-94
Abstract A new class of values combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other class of values such as the Egalitarian Shapley values and the Procedural values are discussed. We propose a strategic implementation of our class of values in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Two axiomatic characterizations are provided: one of the whole class of values, and one of each of its extreme points.
Keywords: TU-games; Solidarity; Null player; Egalitarian Shapley value; Procedural values; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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