Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
Sylvain Ferrières ()
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Sylvain Ferrières: CRESE EA3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté
Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 83, issue 3, 385-406
Abstract We provide characterizations of the equal division values and their convex mixtures, using a new axiom on a fixed player set based on player nullification which requires that if a player becomes null, then any two other players are equally affected. Two economic applications are also introduced concerning bargaining under risk and common-pool resource appropriation.
Keywords: Player nullification; Equal division; Equal surplus division; Bargaining under risk; Common-pool resource (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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