Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
Sylvain Ferrières ()
Additional contact information
Sylvain Ferrières: CRESE EA3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté
Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 83, issue 3, 385-406
Abstract We provide characterizations of the equal division values and their convex mixtures, using a new axiom on a fixed player set based on player nullification which requires that if a player becomes null, then any two other players are equally affected. Two economic applications are also introduced concerning bargaining under risk and common-pool resource appropriation.
Keywords: Player nullification; Equal division; Equal surplus division; Bargaining under risk; Common-pool resource (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-017-9604-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9604-1
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui
More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().