EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

On the characterization of weighted simple games

Josep Freixas (), Marc Freixas and Sascha Kurz
Additional contact information
Josep Freixas: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (Campus Manresa)
Marc Freixas: Cirprotec
Sascha Kurz: University of Bayreuth

Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 83, issue 4, No 2, 469-498

Abstract: Abstract This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main purposes in both theories is to determine when a simple game is representable as a weighted game, which allows a very compact and easily comprehensible representation. Deep results were found in threshold logic in the sixties and seventies for this problem. However, game theory has taken the lead and some new results have been obtained for the problem in the past two decades. The second and main goal of this paper is to provide some new results on this problem and propose several open questions and conjectures for future research. The results we obtain depend on two significant parameters of the game: the number of types of equivalent players and the number of types of shift-minimal winning coalitions.

Keywords: Simple games; Weighted games; Characterization of weighted games; Trade robustness; Invariant-trade robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-017-9606-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9606-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9606-z

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9606-z