Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders

Nejat Anbarci () and Jaideep Roy

Theory and Decision, 2018, vol. 84, issue 1, No 1, 9 pages

Abstract: Abstract Do hard budget constraints work in favour or against truth telling in double auctions? McAfee (1992) constructed a simple double auction mechanism (MDA), which is strategyproof and minimally inefficient, but may resort to dual prices, where the difference between prices is channelled as a surplus to the market maker, preventing MDA from achieving a balanced budget. We construct a variant of MDA in which no-loss constraints play a major positive role. Our variant of MDA is also strategyproof, as efficient as MDA but improves on it by achieving a balanced budget via always having a uniform price.

Keywords: No-loss constraint (NLC); Double auctions (DA); Uniform price; Efficiency; Balanced budget; Sunspots (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:84:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9627-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().