Three-valued simple games

M. Musegaas (), Peter Borm and Marieke Quant
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M. Musegaas: Erasmus University Rotterdam

Theory and Decision, 2018, vol. 85, issue 2, No 4, 224 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we study three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. We analyze to which extent well-known results on the core and the Shapley value for simple games can be extended to this new setting. To describe the core of a three-valued simple game we introduce (primary and secondary) vital players, in analogy to veto players for simple games. Moreover, it is seen that the transfer property of Dubey (1975) can still be used to characterize the Shapley value for three-valued simple games. We illustrate three-valued simple games and the corresponding Shapley value in a parliamentary bicameral system.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Three-valued simple games; Core; Vital players; Shapley value; Transfer property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Three-Valued Simple Games (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9630-z

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