Why do young women marry old men?
Pavlo Blavatskyy ()
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Pavlo Blavatskyy: Montpellier Research in Management
Theory and Decision, 2018, vol. 85, issue 3, 509-525
Abstract This paper presents an overlapping generations household model with positive assortative matching (richer individuals marry richer partners), incomplete information about partner’s type (it takes time to reveal income-earning capabilities of individuals) and a gender pay gap on the labor market (men are more likely to end up with a high-paying job). In equilibrium, a gender pay gap creates an excess supply of desirable husbands and women marry early to increase their chance of being matched with an ideal partner, which results in a gender age gap on the marriage market. A modified model with asymmetric information yields a similar result. An extended model where individuals have an option to remain single (the marriage market does not necessarily clear in equilibrium) yields a similar result as well.
Keywords: Household models; OLG models; Marriage market; Gender wage gap; Age gap at marriage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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