Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

Guy Elaad () and Artyom Jelnov
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Guy Elaad: Ariel University

Theory and Decision, 2018, vol. 85, issue 3, No 6, 375-387

Abstract: Abstract We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.

Keywords: Inspection; Cheating; Doping; Contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5

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