Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies

Thomas Demuynck, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Riccardo Saulle () and Christian Seel

Theory and Decision, 2019, vol. 87, issue 2, No 1, 147-154

Abstract: Abstract We consider a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous goods and we allow for asymmetric marginal costs. We derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck et al. (Econometrica 87:111–138, 2019). In contrast to the set of Nash equilibria, the unique Myopic Stable Set can be easily characterized in closed form and it provides an intuitive set-valued prediction.

Keywords: Bertrand competition; Asymmetric costs; Myopic stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies (2019)
Working Paper: Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Solution in Pure Strategies (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09698-4

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