Gerrymandering in a hierarchical legislature

Katsuya Kobayashi () and Attila Tasnádi
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Katsuya Kobayashi: Faculty of Economics, Hosei University

Theory and Decision, 2019, vol. 87, issue 2, No 7, 253-279

Abstract: Abstract We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which citizens elect ward representatives, ward representatives elect county representatives, county representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases as a result of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters provide a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy.

Keywords: Electoral systems; Median voter; Gerrymandering; Council democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09704-9

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